Distinguishing the Corporal From the Divine: Legal Fictions Create Bodies Not Souls by Ayllon, Daisy
Seventh Circuit Review 
Volume 9 Issue 1 Article 3 
9-1-2013 
Distinguishing the Corporal From the Divine: Legal Fictions Create 
Bodies Not Souls 
Daisy Ayllon 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Daisy Ayllon, Distinguishing the Corporal From the Divine: Legal Fictions Create Bodies Not Souls, 9 
Seventh Circuit Rev. 21 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol9/iss1/3 
This Constitutional Law is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent 
College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Seventh Circuit Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly 
Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 




DISTINGUISHING THE CORPORAL  
FROM THE DIVINE: LEGAL FICTIONS  







Cite as: Daisy Ayllon, Distinguishing the Corporal From the Divine: Legal Fictions 
Create Bodies Not Souls, 9 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 21 (2013), at 





That which is constitutionally shielded is the right of 
the human mind and soul to pursue the ultimate 
existential questions of love, meaning and spiritual 
destiny—arguably the most personal of quests that 
determine our humanity and distinguish us from the 
non-human beasts that tread the earth. It is also what 
most distinguishes us from the non-human or 'fictional' 
entities that are the soulless creations of man-made 
laws: corporations. Because they are wholly devoid of 
humanity and existentially oblivious, neither beasts nor 
artificial "persons" need be constitutionally shielded 
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The right to exercise religion is a “shield, not a sword.”
2
 This 





protects individuals against substantial burdens on their religious 
exercise,
5
 and should not be used offensively to impose one’s religious 
convictions on others or to advance attitudes that are essentially 
political albeit informed by a particular moral or religious perspective. 
The constitutional admonition that Congress should not legislate 
religion and morality
6
 presupposes that it likewise should not disdain 
secularly purposed legislation simply to placate certain moral-turned-
political attitudes. In recent months, the scope of free-exercise 
protections has attracted significant attention in the context of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s requirement that 
employer-provided health insurance plans comply with a “preventative 
care requirement” that offers women of reproductive age contraceptive 




                                                 
2 
O’Brien v. U.S. Dept. of Human Health Services, 894 F.Supp.2d 1149, 1160 
(E.D. Mo. 2012). 
 
3 
U.S. Const. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).   
4
 The text of 42 U.S.C. §2000bb is as follows: 
“(a) In general 
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the 
burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection 
(b) of this section. 
(b) Exception 
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.” 42 U.S.C.§2000bb (1993). 
5
 Id.  
6
 U.S. Const. amend. I.  
7
 Women’s Preventive Services Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. 
ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited October 19, 2013).  
2
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Plaintiffs challenging the “contraceptive mandate,” as it is 
commonly known, argue that it violates their rights under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) because it imposes a 
substantial burden on their religious exercise without meeting strict 
scrutiny.
8
 Although these challenges do present courts with a novel 
issue (whether a secular, for-profit corporation is a “person” capable 
of “exercising religion”), the answer to the broader question should be 
clear: requiring corporate-provided health insurance plans to include 
coverage for contraceptives does not ipso facto violate the free-
exercise rights of corporate shareholders.  
In the consolidated cases of Korte v. Sebelious and Grote v. 
Sebelious, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently had an 
opportunity to address these questions.  The plaintiffs—two Catholic 
families and their respective corporations—filed suit seeking 
preliminary injunctions barring enforcement of the contraceptive 
mandate against them. Contrary to this writer’s ultimate conclusion, 
the Seventh Circuit held that: (1) the families as well as their 
companies had standing to challenge the mandate; (2) compelling 
secular, for-profit corporations to cover these services violates their 
religious-exercise rights; and (3) the government cannot justify the 
burden under strict scrutiny.
9
 Although Judge Rovner agreed with her 
colleagues regarding standing,
10
 she wrote a dissenting opinion 
arguing that secular, for profit corporations should not be accorded 
free-exercise rights.
11
 She further reasoned that the contraceptive 
mandate does pose a direct burden on the shareholders’ exercise of 
religion because the mandate “does not require them to alter their own 
practices in any way,” and it is the corporate health plans (not they) 
that fund the insurance plans provided to employees.
12
 
                                                 
8
 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec. of U.S. Dept. of Health and Human 
Services, 724 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139 ( 2013); 
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 
82 U.S.L.W. 3139 ( 2013).  
9
 Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 659 (7th Cir. 2013).  
10
 Id. at 693 (Rovner, J., dissenting).  
11
 Id. at 715.  
12
 Id.  
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This Comment argues that the Seventh Circuit erred in 
granting relief. First, it will briefly examine the Affordable Care Act’s 
pertinent provision and present a general overview of the development 
of free-exercise law.  This Comment will then survey the ongoing 
litigation across the country, focusing on the Seventh Circuit’s 
opinion.  Finally, in concluding that the Seventh Circuit incorrectly 
held that secular, for-profit corporations can exercise religion, this 
Comment will consider Judge Rovner’s hypotheticals because they 
serve the two-fold purpose of illustrating the wide-ranging 
consequences of the Court’s opinion, and distancing us from the 





A. The Affordable Care Act 
 
In 2010, Congress enacted the Affordable Care Act,
 13
 to 
“increase the number of Americans covered by health insurance and 
decrease the cost of health care.” 
14
  One requirement of the 
Affordable Care Act is that employee healthcare plans provide 
minimum levels of coverage to plan participants.
15
 The Affordable 
Care Act also imposes a general requirement that employer-sponsored 
group health care plans cover “preventative care and screenings.”
 16
  
With respect to women,
17
 employers are expected to provide 
                                                 
13
 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No.111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010). 
14
 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). 
15
 See 42 U.S.C §300gg-13(a)(4)(2013). 
16
 Id.  
17
 Studies have found that 45% of women delay or avoid preventive care 
because of its costs. Additionally, because women require more health care services 
than men and have lower average incomes, their health care cost burden is 
significantly higher than men. See Women at Risk: Why Many Women Are 
Foregoing Needed Health Care, THE COMMON WEALTH FUND MAG. (May 2009), 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2009
4
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additional preventative care as determined by the Health Resources 
and Services Administration (“HRSA”).
18
 
 Following this statutory directive, and after consultation with 
the National Academy of Science,
19
 HRSA promulgated additional 
guidelines requiring employers with at least fifty employees
20
 to 
provide group health plans that cover well-woman visits; gestational 
diabetes screening; testing and counseling for certain sexually 
transmitted diseases; and breastfeeding support, supplies, and 
counseling.
21
 Relevant here, the guidelines also require plans to cover  
“[a]ll Food and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, 
sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling for all 





coverage requirements became effective on August 1, 2012.
24
  
 Like many other Congressional acts, the Affordable Care Act 
carves out exemptions for religious employers.
25
 Recognizing the 




 See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)–(d)(2010). 
19
 Clinical Preventative Services for Women: Closing the Gaps, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, 
http://www.iom.edu/Reports/2011/Clinical-Preventive-services-for-Women-Closing-
the-Gaps.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).   
20
 See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(a)–(d)(2010). 
21
 Women's Preventive Services Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands 
Prevention Coverage for Women's Health and Well–Being, HEALTH RESOURCES & 
SERVS. ADMIN., http:// www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2013). 
22
 Id.  
23
 Congress required coverage of Women's Preventive Healthcare in order to 
address inequities in the current healthcare system, which leads “women of 
childbearing age [to] spend 68 percent more in out-of-pocket health care costs than 
men.” 155 CONG. REC. S12027 (daily ed. Dec. 1, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Gillibrand). 
24
 Women's Preventive Services Guidelines: Affordable Care Act Expands 
Prevention Coverage for Women's Health and Well–Being, HEALTH RESOURCES & 
SERVS. ADMIN., http:// www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2013). 
25
 76 Fed. Reg. 46621-01 (Dep’t of Treasury August 3, 2011) (“the definition set 
forth here is intended to reasonably balance the extension of any coverage of 
contraceptive services under the HRSA Guidelines to as many women as possible, 
5
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religious sensitivity of contraceptive coverage, the Affordable Care 
Act exempts “churches, their integrated auxiliaries, conventions or 
associations of churches, and the exclusively religious activities of 
religious orders.”
26
 Additionally, certain non-exempt, non-profit 
religious organizations may receive an “accommodation” allowing 
them to route contraceptive payments through their insurance 
carriers.
27
 The Affordable Care Act also allows certain 
“grandfathered” plans to avoid providing contraceptive-coverage for a 
limited time; however, the government estimates that these 
grandfathered plans will be phased-out within a few years.  
  To ensure compliance, the Affordable Care Act imposes 
certain financial penalties. Non-exempt employers who refuse to offer 
healthcare plans that include these services face a penalty of $100 per 
day, per employee.
28
 If an employer fails to provide health insurance 
altogether, it faces an annual penalty for each employee. 
29
 Finally, the 
Department of Labor or any plan participant may bring suit against an 
employer that fails to comply with the regulations. 
30
 
In an unprecedented expansion of the free exercise clause, the 
Seventh Circuit held—and this Comment suggests incorrectly so—that 
the contraceptive mandate violates the religious rights of corporate 
shareholders.  
 
B. Development of Free Exercise Law 
 
The free exercise clause “embraces two concepts—freedom to 
believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of 
things, the second cannot be.” 
31
 The free exercise clause is usually 
invoked in one of the following situations: (1) when the government 
                                                                                                                   
while respecting the unique relationship between certain religious employers and 
their employees in certain religious positions.”). 
26
 26 U.S.C. §6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii)(2010).  
27
 45 C.F.R §147.131(b)(2013). 
28
 26 U.S.C. § 4980D(b)(1)(2005). 
29
 See id. § 4980H. 
30
 See id. § 4980H. 
31
 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940). 
6
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prohibits behavior that a person’s religion mandates;
32
 (2) when the 
government requires conduct that a person’s religion prohibits;
33
 and 
(3) when a law impermissibly burdens a person’s religious 
observances. 
34
 Only the second of these situations is relevant to the 
contraceptive mandate.  
 
1. Articulation of Strict Scrutiny Test 
 
 Before the 1960s, the Supreme Court had never explicitly 
articulated a test governing free-exercise-clause challenges.
35
 But in 
Sherbert v. Verner,
36
 the court expressly held that strict scrutiny was 
the appropriate test for evaluating laws burdening the free exercise of 
religion. There, the Court declared unconstitutional the denial of 
unemployment benefits to a woman (a member of the Seventh-day 
Adventist Church) who was discharged from her job because she 
refused to work on the Sabbath. 
37
  The Court said that the denial of 
benefits was a substantial burden on religion because it forced the 
woman to choose between an income and her faith.
38
 Because no 
compelling interest justified the burden, the Court ruled against the 
government. The Court would continue to apply this test —albeit not 
always with consistent rigor
39




                                                 
32
 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding the 
constitutionality of a law forbidding polygamy even though it conflicted with 
Mormon belief that polygamy is required by their religion). 
33
 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting a challenge by Amish 
business owner who claimed that paying Social Security taxes violated their 
sincerely-held religious beliefs).  
34
 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  
35
 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
1292-1924 (4th ed. 2011).  
36
 Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398. 
37
 Id.  
38
 Id. at 406.  
39
 See e.g., U.S. v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (Court avoids using the language 
of strict scrutiny, speaking instead of an “overriding” governmental purpose to 
justify burden in religion).  
40
 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 1292.  
7
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2. Smith’s Change to Rational Basis Test 
 
The law changed significantly in 1990 when the Court decided 
Employment Division v. Smith. 
41
 The Court held that the protections 
of the free exercise clause are unavailable when the government passes 
a neutral law of general applicability. 
42
 Thus, Justice Scalia wrote, 
“the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the 
obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of general 
applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) 
conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’” 
43
 In Smith the 
Court was asked to determine whether a law prohibiting consumption 
of peyote, a hallucinogenic substance, violated the free exercise clause 
when such use was required by some Native American religions.
44
 The 
Court found the law constitutional because it applied to all state 
residents and did not punish conduct solely because it was religiously 
motivated. 
45
 With Smith, the Court abandoned strict scrutiny in the 
case of neutral laws of general applicability, which only had to pass 




Since 1990, the only application of Smith was in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, where the Supreme Court 
declared unconstitutional a city ordinance that prohibited ritual 
sacrifice of animals because the ordinance “had as [its] object the 
suppression of religion.” 
47
 The Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye 
practiced the Afro-Caribbean-based religion of Santeria.
48
 Santeria 
used animal sacrifice as a form of worship in which an animal's 
carotid arteries would be cut and, except during healing and death 
rights, the animal would be eaten. Shortly after the announcement of 
                                                 
41
 494 U.S. 872 (1990).  
42
 Id. at 881.  
43




 Id. at 878-889.  
46
 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 32, at 1303-1305. 
47
 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
48
 Id. at 527.  
8
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the establishment of a Santeria church in Hialeah, Florida, the City 
Council adopted several ordinances prohibiting ritual sacrifice of 
animals. Because the Court determined that the law was neither 
neutral nor of general applicability, it applied strict scrutiny, and held 
that the government failed to demonstrate that it had a compelling 
interest in prohibiting animal sacrifice. 
49
 
After these cases, the free exercise jurisprudence was well-
settled: laws that were neutral and of general applicability only had to 
meet rational basis review, while laws directed at religious practices 





3. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
 
The principles and history of the First Amendment and RFRA 
are intertwined. The Supreme Court’s holding in Smith sparked public 
outrage and prompted religious leaders, churches, civil liberties and 
religious organization, and politicians to lobby Congress to overturn 
Smith by statute.
51
 RFRA was adopted to negate the Smith rational 
basis test, and to instead require strict scrutiny for all free exercise 
claims.
52
 In particular, RFRA provides that the government may not 
“substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,” even by a law of 
general applicability, without demonstrating that the application of the 
burden is “the least restrictive means” to advance a “compelling 
government interest.” 
53
 The key provision of the Act states:  
 
                                                 
49
 Id. at 548.  
50
 42 U.S.C §2000bb-1(a)-(b) (2006). 
51
 See generally Carol M. Kaplan, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, 
Generally Applicable Laws and Exceptions From Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045 
(2000).  
52
 Id.  
53
 Id. (“The purposes of this chapter are— (1) to restore the compelling interest 
test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 
406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise 
of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons 
whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”). 
9
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Government shall not substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results form a rule of general applicability, 
except…[g]overnment may substantially burden a 
person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates 
that application of the burden to the person (1) is in 
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; 





The statute goes on to define “religious exercise” as “any exercise of 
religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of 
religious belief.”
55 
Importantly, however, the statute does not define 
the word “person.” 
 Although in City of Boerne the Supreme Court invalidated 
RFRA as applied to the states and local governments,
56
 the Court later 
unanimously upheld RFRA as valid and enforceable against the 
federal government in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita.
57
 Practically 
speaking, this means that state and local laws that are neutral and of 
general applicability
58
 must be scrutinized under the less-rigorous 
Smith rational basis test, while similar federal laws may be challenged 
under RFRA, which automatically triggers strict scrutiny.
59
 
The Supreme Court has articulated guiding principles for 
determining when courts should apply strict scrutiny under RFRA to 
exempt an individual from compliance with a federal law on the basis 
of religious belief.
60
 First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie 
                                                 
54
  Id. §1(a)-(b).  
55
  42 U.S.C. §2000bb(a)(3)-(5) (2006). 
56
 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
57
 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
439 (2006). 
58
 Strict scrutiny still applies to state and local laws that are non-neutral or that 
target specific individuals or groups.  
59
 Ruthann Robson, Puzzling Corporations: The Affordable Care Act and 
Contraception Mandate, JURIST.ORG (Nov. 5, 2013), 
http://www.jurist.org/forum/2013/11/ruthann-robson-puzzling-corporations.php.  
60
  Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 428. 
10
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RFRA claim by proving that the application of the federal statute 
imposes a substantial burden on a sincere exercise of religion.
61
 If the 
plaintiff succeeds, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate 
that the burden furthers a compelling government interest and that the 
regulation or statute is the least restrictive means of advancing that 
interest. 
 
II. THE LITIGATION 
 
A. Lawsuits Across the Nation 
 
The question of whether for-profit, private corporations can 
exercise religion has created much controversy around the country and 
left deep rifts among the circuits. On the one hand, in rejecting the 
shareholders’ free-exercise and RFRA claims,
 62
 the Third and Sixth 
Circuits concluded that “for-profit, secular corporations cannot engage 
in religious exercise.”
63
 By contrast, the Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits determined that these types of corporations “are ‘persons’ 
within the meaning of RFRA” capable of exercising religion.
64
 The 
D.C. Circuit opted for a middle-of-the-road approach. A divided panel 
affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s denial of a 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the contraceptive 
mandate.
65
 In essence, the court held that the owners of two closely 
                                                 
61
  Id. 
62
 Id.  
63 Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sec. of U.S. Dept. of Health and 
Human Services, 724 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 2013) cert. granted, 82 U.S.L.W. 3139 
( 2013); see also Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 627 (6th Cir.2013) 
(concluding that “Congress did not intend the term “person” to cover entities like 
Autocam when it enacted RFRA.”). 
64
 Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 654 (7th Cir. 2013); Annex Med., Inc. v. 
Sebelius, No. 13-1118, 2013 WL 1276025 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 2013); Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 82 
U.S.L.W. 3139 (2013). 
65
 See Gilardi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 733 F.3d 1208, 
1224 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
11
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held, for-profit businesses are likely to succeed on a RFRA challenge 
to the mandate, although their companies are not.
66
  
The existing circuit split is likely to deepen rapidly given that 




B. Korte v. Sebelious 
  
The Seventh Circuit’s opportunity to weigh-in on this debate 
came in the consolidated cases of Korte v. Sebelious and Grote v. 
Sebelious.
68
 The decision — a sixty-four-page majority ruling and a 
ninety-page dissent— has been the most expansive against the 
contraceptive mandate among the federal circuits thus far.  
While other circuits have ruled in favor of challenges either by 
for-profit companies or by their owners individually, the Seventh 
Circuit was the first court to rule in favor of, and allow challenges by, 
the companies and their respective owners. The Seventh Circuit 
framed the issues as follows: (1) “is a secular, for-profit corporation a 
‘person’ under RFRA?”; (2) “does the contraceptive mandate 
substantially burden the religious exercise rights of any of the 
plaintiffs, individual or corporate?”; and, if the answer to both 
questions is “yes,” (3) can the government justify the mandate under 
strict scrutiny? 
69
 The court answered these questions “yes,” “yes,” and 
“no,” respectively.  
 
1. Plaintiffs: Kortes and K&L Contractors 
 
Cyril and Jane Korte own and operate Korte & Luijohan 
Contractors, Inc. (“K&L Contractors”), a construction company whose 
portfolio has included water and wastewater treatment plants (one of 
                                                 
66
 Id.  
67
 See BECKET FOUND, 
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/#Legatus (last visited Jan. 2, 
2013) for the most up-to-date legal challenges across the country.  
68
 735 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2013).  
69
 Id. at 659.  
12
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which was constructed for the U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons
70
), 
museums, office buildings, county incarceration centers,
 71
 and, most 
recently, renovating the Illinois Supreme Court.
72
 The company 
employs approximately 90 full-time employees, 70 of whom receive 
health insurance through a union. 
73
 The Kortes are followers of the 
Catholic faith
74
 (it is unclear whether any of the employees are 
adherents of Catholicism), and similar to the plaintiffs in virtually all 
such cases filed across the nation, argue that they “seek to manage 
their company in a manner consistent with their Catholic faith, 
including its teachings regarding the sanctity of human life, abortion, 
contraception, and sterilization.” 
75
 After realizing the “conflict 
between their legal and religious duties,” they promulgated “ethical 
guidelines
76
. . . memorializing the faith-informed moral limitations”
77
 
                                                 
70
 Our Client Testimonials, KORTE &LUITJOHAN CONTRACTORS, INC., 
http://korteluitjohan.us/Documents/justice.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).   
71
 Featured Projects, KORTE &LUITJOHAN CONTRACTORS, INC 
http://korteluitjohan.us/featured_project.aspx (last visited Dec. 4, 2013).   
72
 KORTE &LUITJOHAN CONTRACTORS, INC., http://korteluitjohan.us/ (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2013) (follow “News” hyperlink; then follow “Gov. Quinn Announces 
$12.6 Million Rehab Project for IL Supreme Court Building” hyperlink). As part of 
this project, the company contracted with the state of Illinois to complete the job for 
$7, 222, 500.  
73




 Id. at 654.  
76
 Id. at 663, n. 5. As cited by the Seventh Circuit, the company's ethical 
guidelines state:  
1. As adherents of the Catholic faith, we hold to the teachings of the 
Catholic Church regarding the sanctity of human life from conception to natural 
death. We believe that actions intended to terminate an innocent human life by 
abortion, including abortion-inducing drugs, are gravely sinful. We also adhere to 
the Catholic Church's teaching regarding the immorality of artificial means of 
contraception and sterilization.  
2. As equal shareholders who together own a controlling interest in Korte & 
Luitjohan Contractors, Inc., we wish to conduct the business ... in a manner that does 
not violate our religious faith and values.  
3. Accordingly, we and Korte & Luitjohan Contractors, Inc. cannot arrange 
for, pay for, provide, facilitate, or otherwise support employee health plan coverage 
for contraceptives, sterilization, abortion, abortion-inducing drugs, or related 
education and counseling, except in the limited circumstances where a physician 
13
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on the type of health insurance coverage they could provide. Of note, 
their website is devoid of any reference to their Catholic beliefs or 
practices.  
 
2. Plaintiffs: Grotes and Grote Industries 
 
 The Grote Family owns and manages Grote Industries, Inc., 
“one of the world’s leading manufactures and marketers of vehicle 
lighting and safety systems.” 
78
 The company has more than one 
thousand full-time employees and provides a self-insured health-care 
plan.
79
 Like the Korte plaintiffs, the Grote Family and Grote Industries 
argue that complying with the Affordable Care Act would violate their 




                                                                                                                   
certifies that certain sterilization procedures or drugs commonly used as 
contraceptives are being prescribed with the intent to treat certain medical 
conditions, not with the intent to prevent or terminate pregnancy, without violating 
our religious beliefs. 
77
 Id. at 655. 
78
 About Us, GROTE.COM, http://www.grote.com/America/ (last visited Dec. 4, 
2013).   
79
 What is a Self-Insured Health Plan?, SELF INSURANCE INSTITUTE OF 
AMERICA.,http://www.siia.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=4546 (last visited Dec. 
4, 2013).  “A self-insured group health plan (or a 'self-funded' plan as it is also 
called) is one in which the employer assumes the financial risk for providing health 
care benefits to its employees. In practical terms, self-insured employers pay for 
each out of pocket claim as they are incurred instead of paying a fixed premium to 
an insurance carrier, which is known as a fully-insured plan. Typically, a self-insured 
employer will set up a special trust fund to earmark money (corporate and employee 
contributions) to pay incurred claims.” 
These plans are popular because, among other things, employers (1) can 
customize the plan to meet the specific health care needs of its workforce; (2) 
maintain control over the health plan reserves, which enables maximization of 
interest income; (3) do not have to pre-pay for coverage, thereby providing for 
improved cash flow; (4) are not subject to conflicting state health insurance 
regulations/benefit mandates; and (5) are not subject to state health insurance 
premium taxes.  
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3. The Court’s Opinion: Jurisdictional Hurdles 
 
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion, authored by Judge Sykes, 
applied the traditional sliding-scale, two-prong analysis governing 
preliminary injunctions: (1) have the plaintiffs no adequate remedy at 
law such that they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were 
denied?; and (2) can the plaintiffs demonstrate a likelihood of success 
on the merits? Before addressing the merits of the case, the court 
cleared away the possible jurisdictional hurdles.
80
  
The court found that the injury was concrete, particularized, 
and actual or imminent (the mandate requires plaintiffs to provide 
contraception coverage or pay stiff financial penalties).
81
 Next, the 
court concluded that the Kortes and Grotes (as individuals) have 
Article III standing because the mandate injured them in two ways: 
first, since the corporations are closely held, “the mandate’s indirect 
effect on [their] financial interests as controlling shareholders is a 
concrete injury;
82
 and second, the plaintiffs face “intangible” injury to 
their religious-exercise rights because buying the insurance would 
“make them complicit in the morally wrongful act of another.”
83
  
According to the plurality, the shareholder-standing rule was 
not an impediment to hearing this case for two reasons. First, the court 
believed that because the rule is a prudential limitation, it “does not 
affect the court’s authority to hear the case.” Moreover, the court 
concluded that the government waived this argument by failing to 
raise it.
84
  Second, the court reasoned that using its discretion to 
overlook the waiver would be pointless because the plaintiffs would be 
able to avail themselves of the rule’s exception, which allows a 
“shareholder with a direct, personal interest in the cause of action to 
bring suit even if the corporation’s rights are also implicated.”
85
 
                                                 
80






 Id. at 668.  
84
 Id. at 668-669. 
85
 Id. at 668.  
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The court also found that the Anti-Injunction Act was not 
applicable in this case because “[t]hese suits are not suits ‘for the 
purposes of’ restraining the assessment or collection of a tax.”
86
 In 
other words, the contraceptive mandate is not itself a tax provision (i.e. 
the aim is not to raise revenue); rather, it is an independent regulatory 
mandate.
87
 Therefore, these Internal Revenue Code provisions are only 
tangentially implicated.
88
 The payment for noncompliance is best 
characterized as a “penalty.”
89
 Indeed, the court reasoned that the high 





4. The Court’s Opinion: The Merits  
 
The crux of the court’s analysis focused on whether for-profit 
corporations are persons under RFRA.
91
 The court first noted that the 
term “religious exercise” is a broad term.
92
 Next, the court concluded 
that the appropriate definition of the word “person” is the one found in 
the Dictionary Act—one that contemplates corporations.
93
  The court 
rejected the government’s argument that the line should be drawn at 
religiously affiliated nonprofit corporations.
94
 It reasoned that such a 
line is “nowhere to be found in the text of RFRA or any related act of 
Congress.”  
Noting that certain nonprofit corporations have been able to 
successfully claim free-exercise protection, the court then addressed 
whether a for-profit corporation can do the same.
95
 While 
acknowledging that this a novel issue, the court noted that the for-
profit aspect is not an impediment because in the past the court has 
                                                 
86
 Id. at 669.  
87
 Id.  
88
 Id. at 671.  
89
 Id.  
90
 Id.  
91
 Id. at 672.  
92
 Id.  
93
 Id.  
94
 Id. at 675.  
95
 Id. at 679. 
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recognized free-exercise rights of individuals engaged in commercial 
or profit-making activity.
96
 The court relied on United States v. Lee, 
which involved an Amish farmer seeking a religious exception from 
the obligation to withhold and pay social security taxes for his 
employees, for the proposition that the Supreme Court had already 
concluded — albeit implicitly— that moneymaking activity is not 
enough to foreclose a free-exercise claim. 
97
 The court also 
emphatically concluded that the government’s argument that 
“religious exercise is protected in the home and the house of worship 
but not beyond”
98
 is too “circumscribed” because religious people do 
not practice their faith in such “compartmentalized” ways.
99
  
Finally, the court found that the contraceptive mandate 
imposes a substantial burden on the plaintiffs by placing “enormous 
pressure”
100
 on them to violate their religious beliefs. The fines for 
non-compliance, the court argued, would forcer the plaintiffs to 
“choose between saving their companies and following the moral 
teachings of their faith.”
101
 Given the burden on religion, in order to 
survive strict scrutiny, the contraceptive mandate had to be justified by 
a compelling government interest. The court found none.  
The government argued that the compelling interests were 
public health and gender equality, but the court remained 
unconvinced. In fact, it chastised the government for its failure to 
identify concrete interests: “By stating the public interests so 
generally, the government guarantees that the mandate will flunk the 
test.”
102
 The court noted that such generalized interests make it 
impossible to assess whether the required “close-fit” between the 
means and the ends is present. “There are many ways to promote 
public health and gender equality, almost all of them less burdensome 




 Id. at 681. 
98
 Id.  
99
 Id.  
100
 Id. at 685. 
101
 Id.  
102
 Id. at 686. 
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on religious liberty,” the court insisted. 
103
 In short, in the court’s view, 
the government failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the 
mandate survives strict scrutiny.  
Judge Rovner dissented.  Her discussion is considered below as 
part of this Comment’s analysis. 
 
III. ANALYSIS 
Never before has the Supreme Court allowed secular, for-profit 
corporations to claim religious exercise rights, and for good reason. 
The Seventh Circuit’s decision was incorrect in at least two major 
respects: first, because their claims derive solely from the alleged 
injury to the corporations, the plaintiffs-shareholders do not have 
standing to assert a free exercise claim; and second, the majority 
wrongfully concluded that for-profit, secular corporations are 
“persons” that can exercise religion.  
 
A. Shareholding Standing Rule 
  
The individual shareholder claims should have been dismissed 
under the shareholder-standing rule because the individual claims 
derive solely from the alleged injury to the corporations. The 
shareholder-standing rule, a prudential limit on standing,
104
 "prohibits 
shareholders from initiating actions to enforce the rights of the 
corporation unless the corporation's management has refused to pursue 
the same action for reasons other than good-faith business 
judgment."
105
 To be sure, prudential-standing limitations are subject to 
waiver, but the court has discretion to address such issues sua sponte. 
It should have done so here.  




 Gladstone Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (stating that this 
rule is intended to "limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to 
assert a particular claim.").   
105
 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Alcan Aluminium Ltd., 493 U.S. 331, 336 
(1990). 
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Yet the majority held that overlooking the waiver (the 
appellees’ failure to raise this issue) would be pointless because the 
plaintiffs “fall comfortably within the exception.” This conclusion is 
inexplicable. To fall within the exception, the shareholder would have 
to have a “direct, personal interest” in the cause of action.
106
 Here, the 
dilemma the plaintiffs pose cannot be separated from the alleged harm 
to their companies.  
The Sixth Circuit in Autocam Corp. v Sebelius concluded as 
much, noting that the basic purpose of a corporation “is to create a 
distinct legal entity, with legal rights, obligations, powers, and 
privileges different from those of the natural individuals who created 
it, who own it, or whom it employs.”
107
  Thus, it is the corporation, not 
the plaintiffs, that is obligated to comply with the Affordable Care 
Act’s requirements. Any injury to plaintiffs “stems derivatively from 
their fiduciary duties”
108
 under state law and cannot, in any way, be 
classified as a harm distinct from that suffered by the companies.   
The argument that the individuals have sustained a direct 
injury simply by virtue of being required to fulfill their corporate duty 
to implement the contraceptive mandate wholly ignores the 
shareholder-standing limitation that requires their cause of action to be 
unique to them and not derivative of the corporation. Here, the duty to 
comply with the federal regulation in question is an obligation that 
“falls solely on the corporations.”
109
 Any actions (or inactions) by 
plaintiff-shareholders were taken not as individuals acting in their 
personal capacities, but rather as officers and directors of the 
corporations. When acting as fiduciaries, individuals managing a 
corporation must set aside their own religious, political, and 
philosophical beliefs in order to advance the best interests of the 
corporation.
110
 Or as both the Third and Sixth Circuits recognized, 
                                                 
106
 Id.  
107
 Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 627 (6th Cir.2013) (citing Cedric 
Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001)).  
108
 Id.  
109
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1121 (10th Cir. 2013) 
(Bacharach, J concurring).  
110
 Id.  
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when individuals chose to incorporate, a “shareholder must give up 
some prerogatives, ‘including that of direct legal action to redress an 
injury to him as primary stockholder in the business.’” 
111
 Yet it would 
indeed violate their fiduciary duty to the corporation if the plaintiff-
shareholders were permitted to pick and choose when and to what 
extent federal regulations apply to their respective corporations simply 
on the basis of their personal beliefs. 
 But picking and choosing is precisely what these litigants are 
doing.  Though not discussed in the court’s opinion, the plaintiffs 
argued that the companies are “bringing religious free exercise claims 
for not only [themselves], but [for their] religious owners.”
112
 Dubbed 
the “pass through theory,” this argument is not only enigmatic, but 
also contradicts the shareholder-standing rule requiring that a 
shareholder’s cause of action be non-derivative, i.e., separate and 
distinct from any corporate cause of action. Moreover, this theory 
would allow the corporation to assert the rights of its shareholders. 
Stated another way, it would permit corporations to pierce their own 
corporate veils “for the purposes of some sectarian principles such as 
contraception coverage for employees, but presumably to keep their 
protective masks in place regarding personal liability.” 
113
  
This cherry-picking approach is also evident in the way the 
plaintiff-shareholders have chosen to define their corporations as 
‘religious’ in certain spheres (mostly in private), but have opted to 
market them as ‘secular’ to the general public. Perhaps the plaintiff-
shareholders’ hesitation to publicly defined their corporations as 
‘religious’ relates to their prospects for profitability. For example, 
were the Kortes to define their corporation as “Catholic,” it is unlikely 
that the government would recruit K&L Contractors to renovate 
courthouses or build wastewater treatment facilities for the U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, as they have done in the past, out of 
                                                 
111
 Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 624 (6th Cir.2013). 
112
 Brief for Appellants Grote Industries at 18, Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654 
(7th Cir. 2013)(No. 13-1077 Consolidated with No. 12-3841).  
113
 Ruthann Robson, Puzzling Corporations: The Affordable Care Act and 
Contraception Mandate, JURIST.ORG, http://www.jurist.org/forum/2013/11/ruthann-
robson-puzzling-corporations.php  (last visited on Nov. 5, 2013). 
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concern with excessive government entanglement with religion. 
Because, K&L avoids any reference to religion on its website, 
advertising materials, or government contracts, it maintains the ability 
to have it both ways: it can hold itself out as “religious” when it wants 
to avoid a federal law or regulation, but as “secular” when it seeks 
federal benefits such as lucrative government contracts.   
Thus, the Seventh Circuit should have dismissed the 
shareholder’s claims and should have considered only whether a 
corporation is a person capable of exercising religion.  
 
B. Corporate Personhood 
 
RFRA provides a cause of action to “any person whose 
religious exercise has been burdened.” 
114
 The question facing courts 
for the first time is whether corporations are “persons” capable of 
“religious exercise” under RFRA. Congress did not define the term 
“person” when it enacted RFRA. Thus, courts have looked to the 
Dictionary Act, which provides default definitions for terms used in 
the U.S. Code, for guidance. 
115
 Admittedly, the Dictionary Act 
provides that “the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock 
companies, as well as individuals.” 
116
 Importantly, however, the 
Dictionary Act also cautions courts to look at the context of the statute 
to determine whether, in fact, Congress intended such definition to 
apply: “In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless 
the context indicates otherwise…”
117
 Therefore, when examining 
RFRA, this “context” must necessarily include “the body of free 
exercise case law that existed at the time of RFRA’s passage.”
118
 
Examining this context leads to only one logical conclusion: 
Congress did not intend to include corporations organized for secular, 
                                                 
114
 42 U.S.C §2000bb-1(c) (2006). 
115
 See Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 626.  
116
 1 U.S.C §1 (2012).  
117 Id. (emphasis added). 
118
 Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1166-68 (10th Cir. 
2013) (Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
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profit-seeking purposes as “persons” under RFRA.
119
 Specifically, 
Congress’s express purpose in enacting RFRA was to restore the type 
of claims articulated in Sherbert and Yoder —claims  that were 
fundamentally personal. In Sherbert, the Court held that strict scrutiny 
should be used in evaluating laws burdening free exercise of religion 
and declared unconstitutional the denial of unemployment benefits to a 
woman who was discharged from her job because she refused to work 
on her Saturday Sabbath. 
120
 In Yoder, also applying strict scrutiny, the 
Court held that an individual’s interest in the free exercise of religion 
outweighed the State’s interest in compelling school attendance 
beyond the eighth grade.
121
 The plaintiffs in Yoder were members of 
the Amish religion and were prosecuted under Wisconsin state law for 
failing to send their children to school through age sixteen. The Court 
found persuasive the parents’ argument that high school attendance 
was contrary to their religious beliefs.
122
 Thus, in both Sherbert and 
Yoder, the plaintiffs complained of actual restrictions on, or penalties 
deriving from, their personal behavior.  
The holdings of these cases (which acknowledge the personal 
nature of free-exercise rights) are congruent with original 
Constitutional intent. This nation was founded, and the U.S. 
Constitution drafted, on the fundamental premise that individuals 
should be free to choose what to believe and how to lead their own 
lives.
123
 Undeniably, the pursuit of happiness presupposes self-
awareness. The Framers of the Constitution sought to secure for 
individuals conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness, which 




It is true that during the last century, the Supreme Court has 
held that corporations are persons entitled to numerous constitutional 
                                                 
119
 Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d. at 625.  
120
 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
121
 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).  
122
 Id.   
123
 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 203 (1986) ((Blackmun, J., 
dissenting), overruled by, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
124
 Id. at 207 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564–65 (1969)). 
22
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 3
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol9/iss1/3




protections, and consequently has invalidated certain laws infringing 
upon those corporate rights.
125
 Tellingly, however, in the 200-year 
span between the adoption of the First Amendment and RFRA’s 
passage, the Supreme Court has confined free exercise rights to 
individuals and non-profit religious organizations.
126
 That is, never 
before has the Supreme Court allowed corporations with no religious 
affiliation to claim religious freedom, and justifiably so. Until secular, 
for-profit corporations become self-aware, religious freedom in the 
pursuit of happiness is simply logically inapplicable to them.  
Though the legal doctrine of corporate personhood has allowed 
corporations to claim similar Constitutional rights as natural persons in 
some spheres,
127
 corporate personhood is inapplicable to the 
contraceptive mandate. Corporate personhood is no more than a legal 
fiction used to facilitate commerce,
128
 which grants corporations 
standing to enter into contracts, to hold property, to sue and be sued, 
                                                 
125
 The Supreme Court first stated that corporations were persons for purposes 
of the Fourteenth Amendment in Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 
(1886). 
126
 Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d. at 626 (citing Hobby Lobby, 723 F.3d at 1166-68 
(Briscoe, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
127
 Susanna Kim Ripken, Corporate First Amendment Rights After Citizens 
United: An Analysis of the Popular Movement to End the Constitutional Personhood 
of Corporations, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 209 (2011). 
128
 See Jeffrey Nesteruk, Persons, Property, and the Corporation: A Proposal 
for a New Paradigm, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 543, 564 n.133 (1990) (“A corporation is 
artificial in that it is a human creation subject to human choices.”); James V. Schall, 
The Corporation: What Is It?, 4 AVE MARIA L. REV. 105, 118 (2006) (describing the 
corporation as primarily a human invention created for man's use). Legal personhood 
can be given to just about any object if it is deemed to serve the ends of justice. See, 
e.g., Richard Tur, The “Person” in Law, in PERSONS AND PERSONALITY: A 
CONTEMPORARY INQUIRY 116, 121 (Arthur Peacocke & Grant Gillett eds., 1987) 
(referring to a case where an Indian idol was given a legal personality); see also 
Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 347, 350 
(1911) (noting that purely inanimate objects may be personified, e.g., the estate of a 
deceased person, a jury, or a community). The term “natural person” typically refers 
to human beings. See Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed 
Framework for Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 373 (2007) (“‘Natural 
person’ is the term used to refer to human beings' legal status.”). 
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and ultimately to carry on business in the corporate name.
129
 And 
although this legal recognition in the commercial context does not 
seem particularly problematic, blurring or politicizing the distinction 
between natural persons and corporations so as to imbue corporations 
with an additional legal fiction of self-awareness does irreparable 
harm to very human constitutional notions of individual freedom of 
conscience and self-fulfillment.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
consistently cautioned against such harm in its jurisprudence.  
Whether a particular guarantee is "purely personal," and thus 
unavailable to corporations, “depends on the nature, history, and 
purpose of the particular constitutional provision.”
130
 From a historical 
perspective, the notion that corporations must be treated identically to 
natural persons —not only in the political sphere, but now also in the 
context of religious liberty— is misguided.  In his dissent, Justice 
Stevens’ analysis in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission is 
helpful in understanding how the Framers and their contemporaries 
conceived of the First Amendment. To begin, their conception of these 
freedoms was narrower than we now think of them.
131
 They also had 
very different views about the “role of corporations in society.”
132
 
Thomas Jefferson, for instance, famously fretted that corporations 
would subvert the Republic.
133
 In Colonial America, corporations were 
                                                 
129
 See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.02 (2005) stating: 
“[E]very corporation has perpetual duration and succession in its corporate name and 
has the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to 
carry out its business and affairs, including without limitation power: (1) to sue and 
be sued, ... (4) to ... own, hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal with, real or 
personal property, ... (7) to make contracts and guarantees ....” 
130
 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n. 14 (1978). 
131 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Commn., 558 U.S. 310, 426 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (referencing Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some 
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L. J. 1, 22 (1971)).  
132
 Id.  
133
 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Tom Logan (Nov. 12, 1816), in 12 THE 
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 42, 44 (P. Ford ed. 1905) (“I hope we shall . . . crush 
in [its] birth the aristocracy of our monied corporations which dare already to 
challenge our government to a trial of strength and bid defiance to the laws of our 
country.”). 
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“authorized by grant of a special legislative character.”
134
 It was 
“assumed that [they] were legally privileged organizations that had to 
be closely scrutinized by the legislature because their purposes had to 
be made consistent with public welfare.”
135
  
The Framers took it as a given that corporations could be 
regulated in the service of public welfare.
136
 And they had “little 
trouble distinguishing corporations from human beings.” 
137
 Thus, 
when the First Amendment was adopted, it was individuals they had in 
mind, not corporations.
138
 Even “the notion that business corporations 
could invoke the First Amendment would probably have been quite a 
novelty,” given that “at the time, the legitimacy of every corporate 
activity was thought to rest entirely in a concession of the 
sovereign.”
139
 As a matter of general expectation, then, it is absurd to 
think that corporations are to be treated like, and guaranteed the same 
protections as, natural persons—everywhere, all the time, no matter 
what.   
How, then, does one reconcile the fact that the Supreme Court 
has accorded free-speech rights to corporations with the notion that 
religious freedom is reserved only for natural persons?  The answer to 
this question relates to the purposes underlying the respective rights. 
In examining the purpose of the constitutional guarantee of free 
                                                 
134
 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
135
 R. SEAVOY, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784–
1855 (1982). 
136
 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 428 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
137
 Id.  
138
 Id.  
139
 Id. (quoting Shelledy, Autonomy, Debate, and Corporate Speech, 18 
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 541, 578 (1991); cf. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636 (1819) (Marshall, C. J.) (“A corporation is an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law. 
Being the mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties which the charter 
of its creation confers upon it”); Julian N. Eule, Promoting Speaker Diversity: Austin 
and Metro Broadcasting, 1990 S. CT. REV. 105, 129 (“The framers of the First 
Amendment could scarcely have anticipated its application to the corporation form. 
That, of course, ought not to be dispositive. What is compelling, however, is an 
understanding of who was supposed to be the beneficiary of the free speech 
guaranty—the individual.”). 
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speech, the Supreme Court has identified three main functions. First, 
freedom of speech is indispensable for self-government. “People 
communicate on political matters so that they can intelligently 
participate in the democratic process.”
140
 Second, freedom of speech is 
also important because, “in a marketplace of ideas, the better ideas 
eventually prevail through competition.”
141
 Finally, freedom of speech 
promotes “self-fulfillment and autonomy.”
142
 Thus, “because 
[corporations] have property, financial, and political interests, [they] 
of course have a free speech interest in protecting and promoting those 
interests and in pursuing their agendas, be their stated goals charitable, 
religious, political, or profit-making.” 
143
  
Free exercise of religion, by contrast, is an intensely individual 
endeavor, one that deals with an individual’s personal conscience, and 
one that is essential to an individual’s relationship with his Creator. As 
James Madison put it: “the Religion then of every man must be left to 
the conviction and conscience of every man.” 
144
  In short, unlike 
freedom of corporate speech, the right to exercise one’s religion serves 
a purely personal objective. For as the Supreme Court has said, certain 
“purely personal” guarantees (such as the privilege against self-
incrimination) “are unavailable to corporations and other organizations 
because the "historic function" of the particular guarantee has been 
limited to the protection of individuals.”
145
  As such, analogies to 
freedom of speech (to promote purely corporate objectives) are not 
only illogical but in defiance of the Framers’ concept of what it means 
to pursue happiness. 
                                                 
140
 Freedom of Speech: Three Rationales, NAHMOD LAW, 
http://nahmodlaw.com/2010/01/19/an-introduction-to-freedom-of-speech/ (last 
visited December 16, 2013).  
141
 Id.  
142
 Id.  
143
 Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 654 (7th Cir. 2013) (Rovner, J., 
dissenting).  
144
 James Madison, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 
http://religiousfreedom.lib.virginia.edu/sacred/madison_m&r_1785.html (last visited 
December 16, 2013). 
145
 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 n. 14 (1978) 
(citations omitted).  
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Ignoring all of this, the Seventh Circuit extended arguably the 
most personal constitutional right to a “man-made legal fiction that has 
no conscience enabling belief or worship.”
146
  Perhaps if the stakes 
were not so high, the court’s ruling would not be so problematic. But 
as Judge Rovner aptly notes, the court’s expansive and unfounded 
interpretation of RFRA threatens to allow corporations not only to 
protect their rights, but to use these protections as a sword against 
others (as opposed to as a shield to protect individuals from substantial 
government burdens on religious exercise
147
) and to evade complying 
with the law whenever a shareholder’s views conflict with it.
148
  
Judge Rovner’s hypotheticals illustrate this point poignantly as 
she urges us in her dissent to consider the ramifications of holding that 
a corporation is a ‘person.’ She asks us to suppose, for instance, that 
an employee has Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (“ALS”)
149
, 
commonly known as Lou Gehrig’s Disease, and has been accepted 
into a clinical trial testing the effectiveness of an embryonic stem-cell 
therapy on ALS. Under the Affordable Care Act, the company’s health 
plan must cover the costs of routine care associated with clinical trials 
involving treatment for cancer and other life-threatening conditions. 
Suppose also that the employer’s sole owner and chief executive 
officer shares the United Methodist Church’s disapproval of research 
and therapies based on stem cells. Based on the plurality’s ruling, the 
owner and corporation would have a colorable argument that the 
Affordable Care Act (and perhaps other federal laws) substantially 
burdens their free exercise rights.
150
  This rationale would make 
virtually any federal law subject to the vagaries of the religious beliefs 
of any controlling corporate shareholder. It also means that courts 
would have to constantly revisit the nature of a corporation’s asserted 
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 Korte, 735 F.3d at 688 (Rovner, J., dissenting). 
147 O'Brien, 894 F. Supp. 2d at 1159. 
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 Id. at 689. 
149
 Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, PUB-MED HEALTH, 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmedhealth/PMH0001708/ (last visited December 
16, 2013). ALS is a progressive neurodegenerative disease that affects nerve cells in 
the brain and spinal cord. When the nerve cells die, the person becomes paralyzed. 
150
 Korte, 735 F.3d at 690 (Rovner, J., dissenting).  
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religious interests because, as Judge Rovner points out, it is unclear 
what beliefs would be attributable to a corporation if, for example, one 
of a corporation’s two equal owners is Catholic and the other Muslim, 
or if the corporation changes ownership, or if the owners have “diverse 
degrees of devotion and diverse notions as to whether and how the 
corporation ought to reflect their religious beliefs.”
151
 
Judge Rovner then asks us to consider an even more 
preposterous potential outcome of the plurality’s holding: imagine that 
a corporation's sole owner is "a life-long member of the Church of 
Christ, Scientist. Christian Science dogma postulates that illness is an 
illusion or false belief that can only be addressed through prayer which 
realigns one’s soul with God."
152
 Imagine also that the owner believes 
that his company’s compliance with the Affordable Care Act’s 
mandate to cover traditional medical care would be a violation of his 
religious principles. As in the prior case, this owner would also have a 
colorable legal claim. Judge Rovner recognizes in both hypotheticals 
that the government would likely argue that it has a compelling 
interest in pursuing universal healthcare access. Even so, under the 
plurality’s decision, the government’s argument would be defeated 
because it could pursue its goals through less-restrictive means, which 
would not require companies to subsidize healthcare that is 
inconsistent with the owner’s personal beliefs. 
153
 
What these hypotheticals demonstrate is that the Seventh 
Circuit’s ruling allows employers to invoke the free exercise clause 
“offensively rather than defensively […and it permits] corporate 
employers to rewrite the terms of the statutorily-mandated health plans 




IV. CONCLUSION  
Both the Grotes and the Kortes chose to incorporate, thereby 
obtaining both the advantages and disadvantages of the corporate 
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form. In applying Constitutional rights to inanimate entities, and in 
interpreting the scope of religious freedom, courts must draw sensible 
lines because virtually anything can potentially affect someone’s 
religious freedoms. In drawing these lines, the Seventh Circuit should 
have at least considered whether the contraceptive mandate directly 
targets or otherwise actively interferes with the free exercise of 
religion, or whether it is instead merely the type of minimal burden 
that every person living in a cosmopolitan society must endure. It also 
should have paused before imbuing corporations with a spiritual 
existence, effectively creating an additional legal fiction that christens 
corporations as self-aware ‘persons’ with the constitutional right to 
pursue happiness through the exercise of religion. After all, the human 
impulse to explore spirituality is existential in nature, and as such was 
afforded constitutional protection by the Framers. It is also an impulse 
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